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
Enhancing Cross-Sectoral Collaboration in Cybersecurity in
Estonia, Czechia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and the Netherlands

Security Risk Management of Baseboard Management Controller

Raimundas Matulevičius

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Coordinator of the SECURE-NET project

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



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What is Security Risk Management?


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Domain Model for Security Risk Management



Security Appraisal Framework

OCP: Open Compute Project



- **Critical Assets**

- A listing of all security-impacting assets within the firmware, and the corresponding Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability requirements for each

- **Attack Surface Enumeration**


- A listing of all remote, local and physical attack surfaces exposed by the device


- **Adversarial Model**

- A listing of all threat actors along with their motivation and capabilities

- **Security Objectives**

- The high-level security objectives or key risks exposed by the firmware





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Critical assets

Attack Surface Enumeration

Adversarial model

Security Objectives

Application of Security Appraisal Framework for BMC

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
Critical Assets

Critical assets

Attack Surface Enumeration

Adversarial model

Security Objectives



"Treating firmware, credentials, and out-of-band channels as primary assets" [LinkedIn comment]

Attack Surface Enumeration

Critical assets

Attack Surface Enumeration

Adversarial model

Security Objectives

Capture: How does the system capture data? How is data entered into the system?


Transmit: How is data transmitted between different devices?


Store: How is data stored in the device (format, type, structure of storing, etc)?


Retrieve: How is data are retrieved from the device (permissions)?


Manipulate: How is data calculated, compared, estimated, changed, aggregated, etc?


Display: How data is displayed to the user/ administrator (correctness of display, authorised access to see the displayed data, use of the received/ displayed data)?














Adversarial Model

Critical assets

Attack Surface Enumeration

Adversarial model

Security Objectives

- Opportunistic Internet-based attack
- Targeted intranet-based attack
- Targeted host-based attack

Ahti Pellinen, Baseboard management controller vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and exploitation. A case study of Supermicro X11-based BMC security, Master's thesis, Jyväskylä: JAMK University of Applied Sciences, December 2023, 75 pp

Adversarial Model

Critical assets

Attack Surface Enumeration


Adversarial model

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

Ahti Pellinen, Baseboard management controller vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and exploitation. A case study of Supermicro X11-based BMC security, Master's thesis, Jyväskylä: JAMK University of Applied Sciences, December 2023, 75 pp

A diagram illustrating the word 'SUNSET' using a central node 'E' (yellow square with a blue border and a blue padlock icon) connected to five other nodes: 'S' (white circle), 'N' (blue circle), 'T' (blue circle), 'C' (white circle), and 'R' (white circle). The nodes 'S', 'N', and 'T' are arranged vertically around 'E', while 'C' and 'R' are arranged horizontally. The nodes 'C' and 'R' are further connected to a final node 'U' (white circle) on the right, forming the word 'SUNSET'.





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
Opportunistic Internet-based attack



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Adversarial Model

Critical assets

Attack Surface Enumeration

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
PMFault: Faulting and Bricking Server CPUs through Management Interfaces

Critical assets

Attack Surface Enumeration

Adversarial model

Security Objectives



Chen, Z., & Oswald, D. (2023). PMFault: Faulting and Bricking Server CPUs through Management Interfaces: Or: A Modern Example of Halt and Catch Fire. IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2023(2), 1-23.

Adversarial Models

Code problem

Configuration errors

- The latest version is not used
- Encryption configuration
- Authentication configuration
- Communication configuration

Security problems in the BMC architecture

- Potential DMA attack
- The interface has security defects
- Fragile update mechanism

Network Attacks

Software modifications

Attacking Firmware from the Operating System

Hardware Upgrades

Establishing Persistence

Option ROM Attack

Direct Memory Access (DMA)

Processor-Level Vulnerability Exploitation

Device Disabling

Critical assets

Attack Surface Enumeration

Adversarial model

Security Objectives

Security Objectives

- BMC configuration
- Network configuration
- Additional measures


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
Security Objectives

BMC Configuration



- Change the default password during installation
- Create user policies and roles on BMC
- Use the IP Access Policy to enable BMC access from management servers
- Customise notifications and alerts for high-severity event log and maintenance event log entries
- Configure BIOS security features by OOB management
- Configure the BMC management account security feature
- Customise service ports information on the BMC to your data centre specifications
- Configure the BMC lockdown feature

Network and Additional Measures





Network configuration


- Restrict inbound traffic over the internet directly to BMCs
- Reserve a special IP address range (private subnets) for BMC management interfaces and management servers
- Configure the firewall to restrict outbound traffic from BMC, including alerts, within the reserved IP range

Additional measures

- Monitor for unusual traffic between BMC and other machines in the network
- Pay attention to firmware release notes
 - Especially related to security fixes
 - Plan upgrades of the firmware during maintenance cycles







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<https://www.linkedin.com/company/109759990/admin/dashboard/>

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